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Notes
CERCLA Response Costs and CGL Policies:
Insureds Find a Favorable Forum in
Missouri
FarmlandIndustries,Inc. v. Republic Insurance Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION

A comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance policy typically
obligates an insurance provider to indemnify an insured for any damages the
insured may become legally obligated to pay because of property damage or
personal injury. With regard to environmental liability, tremendous controversy
has arisen as to the scope of these policies when they do not specify the
liabilities which constitute insurable "damages." More specifically, this debate
has centered around whether environmental cleanup costs (or response costs),
as a form of equitable relief, are encompassed by the term "damages" as
contained in CGL policies. Insurance providers have historically contended that
the definition of "damages" is limited solely to obligations to pay traditional
legal remedies, while insureds have argued that the term includes both legal and
equitable obligations.
State and federal courts have come down on both sides of the debate. In
FarmlandIndustries, Inc. v. Republic Insurance Co., the Supreme Court of

Missouri resolved this issue in favor of insureds. Though the Farmlandholding
is clearly consistent with other courts which have decided this issue under
similar rules of insurance policy interpretation, there remains a substantial split
of authority. This lack of uniformity has plagued insurers and insureds with
uncertainty and confusion concerning their potential responsibility for
environmental liability. In turn, this has led to such problems as forum
shopping, inefficient use of resources, and the potential demise of the
environmental liability insurance market.2

1. 941 S.W.2d 505 (Mo. 1997).
2. See Kenneth S. Abraham, EnvironmentalLiabilityand the Limits ofInsurance,
88 COLUM. L. REv. 942, 944 (1988); Debi L. Davis, Insureds Versus Insurers: Litigating
Comprehensive General Liability Coverage in the CERCLA Arena-A Losing Battlefor
Both Sides, 43 Sw. L. J. 969, 992-95 (1990).
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II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Farmland Industries, Farmer's Chemical Company, and Union Equity
Cooperative Exchange ("Farmland"), as insureds, filed a declaratory judgment
action in the Circuit Court of Clay County against the following insurance
companies: Republic Insurance Company, Millers' Mutual Insurance
Association of Illinois, The Home Insurance Company, The Home Indemnity
Company, First State Insurance Company, and Hartford Accident and Indemnity
Company ("Insurers"). 3 Farmland sought a determination that the excess
liability policies issued by Insurers4 obligated Insurers to indemnify Farmland
for environmental response costs incurred under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)5 and
similar state laws, and/or to defend Farmland against suits to recover such costs.6
More specifically, Farmland averred that the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and various state agencies had required Farmland to
conduct investigation and/or remediation activities pursuant to CERCLA and
similar state statutes. They argued that the costs associated with these activities

3. Id. at 506.
4. The policies include CGL policies, umbrella policies, and various other excess
liability policies. They contain language similar or identical to the following: "The
company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which the Insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of... property damage.... ." Id. at 507
(emphasis added).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 - 9675 (1994).
6. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 507-08 (Mo. 1997).
CERCLA jurisdiction is triggered by the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances from a facility into the environment. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(1), 9606(a)
(1994). Once such a release has occurred, CERCLA imposes strict and potentially joint
and several liability on potentially responsible parties ("PRPs"), which include: (1) the
current owner and operator of the facility; (2) any past owners and operators of the
facility where hazardous substances were disposed of during their ownership or
operation; (3) parties that arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances at
the facility; and (4) parties that selected the facility for the disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances they transported there. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); see also United
States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating that CERCLA
imposes strict liability and, in the discretion of the trial court, joint and several liability).
Analogous state statutes impose similar liability, though Farmlanddoes not identify these
state laws. Farmland,941 S.W.2d at 506.
CERCLA makes PRPs responsible for, inter alia,the costs incurred in repairing a
contaminated site, known as response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). The term
"response costs" encompasses two responses to environmental harm: removal and
remedial action. Removal means, inter alia, "the cleanup or removal of released
hazardous substances from the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23) (1994). Remedial
action means, inter alia, "those actions consistent with the permanent remedy taken
instead of or in addition to removal actions in the event of a release or threatened release
of a hazardous substance into the environment." 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24) (1994).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/4
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were covered by the relevant polices. 7 Farmland additionally alleged that it
faced substantial defense costs and liability for damages arising from alleged
property damage and personal injury at sites located in Missouri and other
states.8
The controversy in this case concerns the meaning of the term "damages"
as used in the excess liability policies issued to Farmland by Insurers.9 Farmland

argued the term included equitable relief, i.e., environmental response costs.' 0
Insurers, on the other hand, argued the term "damages" included only legal
damages, and that they were not obligated to indemnify Farmland for its liability
for environmental response costs or to defend Farmland against suits to recover
such costs."
Farmland moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a declaration that
the environmental response costs at issue constituted "damages" under the
relevant policies.' 2 Insurers filed a cross-motion for summary judgment,
contending that the term "damages" did not include environmental response
costs.'" The trial court denied Farmland's motion for summary judgment, but
granted Insurers' cross-motion.' 4 Farmland appealed, and the case was
transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court prior to an opinion of the Missouri
Court of Appeals. 5
The Missouri Supreme Court unanimously reversed the trial court and
remanded the case for further proceedings.' 6 Abrogating McDonough v. Liberty

7. Farmland,941 S.W.2d at 508. CERCLA authorizes the President to enter into

agreements with PRPs to perform appropriate response actions. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(a)
(1994). Upon approval by the Attorney General of the United States, the agreement is
entered as a consent decree in the appropriate United States District Court. 42 U.S.C. §
96229(d)(1)(A) (1994). In the instant case, Farmland presented evidence that it had

entered into such agreements with the EPA and various state agencies. Farmland,941
S.W.2d at 508.
8. Farmland,941 S.W.2d at 508. These potential costs are not attributable to
CERCLA, and therefore, are not pertinent to the court's holding. Though the court does
not specify the grounds for such potential liability, it is likely premised on the common
law torts of trespass and nuisance.
9. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
10. Farmland, 941 S.W.2d at 508. The parties agreed that environmental response
costs constitute equitable relief. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 506.
15. ld. Mo. R. Civ. P. 83.06 permits a case to be transferred to the Missouri

Supreme Court prior to an opinion by the court of appeals, upon application by a party
or by the supreme court sua sponte, because of the general interest or importance of a
question involved in the case, for the purpose of reexamining existing law, or for the
purpose of equalizing the work load of the appellate courts.
16. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 506 (Mo. 1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Mutual Insurance Co.,' 7 the court held that under Missouri law, when a

comprehensive general liability insurance policy indemnifies for damages due
to property damage, the term "damages," when given its plain and ordinary
meaning, encompasses environmental response costs incurred under CERCLA
8
and similar state statutes.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Whether environmental response costs constitute "damages" within the
meaning of CGL policies is a controversy dating back nearly halfa century. The
early cases did not evaluate the scope of CGL policy coverage in the context of
statutory environmental liability, such as under CERCLA, but, rather, did so
with regard to court-ordered injunctions to conduct environmental cleanup.
However, the issue was the same: whether the cleanup costs incurred were
"damages" under the relevant CGL policies. The early trend was to exclude
cleanup costs from the definition of the term "damages," but in the late 1980's,
more courts began to hold that environmental cleanup costs are covered by CGL
policies.
This section discusses some of the more notable cases in the history of this
debate. The significance of these cases lies in their precedential value as well
as their underlying rationale. Moreover, they are illustrative of the inconsistency
and lack of uniformity among courts which besets this issue.
A. Setting Precedent.DistinguishingBetween Law and Equity
Desrochersv. New York Casualty Co.'9 and Aetna Casualtyand Surety Co.
v. Hanna appear to be the first state and federal circuit cases, respectively, to
determine the scope of coverage of CGL policies in the context of environmental
liability. By interpolating the common law remedies-at-law/remedies-in-equity
dichotomy into the term "damages," these early cases established a precedent in
favor of insurance providers by excluding equitable obligations from the
purview of CGL policies.
In Desrochers,the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the term
"damages" contained in a comprehensive personal liability (CPL) policy covered
only legal remedies and not equitable relief.2' The insured alleged that his CPL
policy covered costs incurred in complying with an injunction requiring him to

17. 921 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the term "damages" in a CGL
policy did not include equitable relief).
18. Farmland,941 S.W.2d at 512.

19. 106 A.2d 196 (N.H. 1954).
20. 224 F.2d. 499 (5th Cir. 1955).

2 1.Desrochers, 106 A.2d at 198. The CPL policy in Desrochersprovided coverage
similar to a typical CGL policy. See id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/4
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remove an obstruction to a culvert which had caused flooding of adjoining land.
Rejecting the insured's arguments, the court reasoned that legal damages were
"recompense for injuries sustained," and as such, were remedial rather than
preventive." On the other hand, the court held that equitable injunctive relief
was premised on the prevention of the recurrence of a past injury, and was
therefore not "in any real sense equivalent" to damages.23
In Hanna,the Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the reasoning and result in
Desrochersin concluding that, under Florida law, the term "damages" in a CPL
policy did not include costs incurred in complying with an injunction.24 The
injunction required the insureds to remove boulders and fill material from an
adjacent property, and to construct a bulkhead between the two properties, the
costs of which they alleged were covered by the CPL policy.25 In construing the
term "damages," the court noted it had an "accepted technical meaning in law,"
and concluded that the costs associated with the removal of debris and the
construction of a bulkhead-both equitable remedies-were a "far cry" from
comporting with this definition.26
B. Abandoning the Desrochers-HannaPrecedent:Ignoring the LawEquity Distinction
In United States Aviex Co. v. TravelersInsurance Co.,27 the Michigan Court
of Appeals became the first court to hold that the term "damages" in a CGL
policy included environmental cleanup costs. 28 The court expressly rejected the
Desrochersand Hannadistinction between law and equity, finding this approach
to interpret the term "damages" too narrowly. 29 The court reasoned that if a state
undertook environmental cleanup and then sued an insured to recover those
costs, the obligation of the insurer to defend and indemnify would be
undeniable. 30 The fact that the state forced the insured to bear full responsibility
for environmental cleanup, rather than to undertake such measures itself and
seek reimbursement, was merely fortuitous. 31 Damage to natural resources, the

22. Id.

23. Id. at 199.
24. Hanna, 224 F.2d at 503. The CPL policy in Hannaprovided coverage similar
to a typical CGL policy. See id.
25. Id. at 501.
26. Id. at 503. The Hanna court defined "damages" as "[a] pecuniary compensation
or indemnity which may be recovered in the courts by any person who has suffered loss,

detriment or injury, whether to his person, property, or rights, through the unlawful act
or negligence of another." Id. (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)).
27. 336 N.W.2d 838 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983).
28. See Davis, supra note 2, at 978.

29. United States Aviex, 336 N.W.2d at 842-43.
30. Id. at 843.
31. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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court explained, is simply measured as the cost to restore an area to its original
state, regardless of which actor undertakes the endeavor. 32 "By rejecting the
equity-damage distinction in old insurance case law, U.S. Aviex set a modem
precedent for other courts to follow and is the leading authority for the
proposition that environmental cleanup costs are damages
under a CGL policy
33
despite the apparent equitable character of the remedy.
C. Recent Cases Holding That CGL PoliciesDo Not Cover
EnvironmentalCleanup Costs
Two significant recent cases holding that environmental cleanup costs are
not "damages" are Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco, Inc. 34 and Continental
InsuranceCo. v. NortheasternPharmaceuticaland Chemical Co. (NEPACCO
11). 35 Armco is significant because it appears to be the first case to confront this
issue in the context of CERCLA liability. NEPACCOIfisimportant because of
its interpretation of Missouri law.
In Armco, the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the reasoning in U.S. Aviex
and held that under Maryland law, the term "damages" excluded CERCLA
response costs. 36 In reaching this conclusion, the court accorded the term
"damages" its legal and technical meaning as suggested in Hanna.37 Because
response costs are equitable in nature, the court felt that it would be a "great and
dangerous step" to begin to construe insurance policies to encompass costs
associated with equitable remedies. 38 "By coming down squarely in the comer
of insurers, the Armco decision created precedent that fueled the fire in the battle
between39insurers and insureds over CGL policy interpretation in the CERCLA
arena."

In NEPACCO II,the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed its prior panel
decision,40 and held that under Missouri law, the term "damages" in a CGL
policy referred only to legal damages and did not cover environmental response
costs incurred under CERCLA." The court's analysis stemmed from its
determination that Missouri law required the language of insurance contracts to

32. Id.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Davis, supra note 2, at 979.
822 F.2d. 1348 (4th Cir. 1987).
842 F.2d 977 (8th Cit.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
Armco, 822 F.2d at 1350.
Id. at 1352.
Id. at 1353.

39. Davis, supra note 2, at 982.

40. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 811 F.2d
1180, 1189 (8th Cir. 1987) (NEPACCO1)(holding 2-1 that response costs incurred under
CERCLA were "damages" within the meaning of a CGL policy).

41. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977, 985 (8th Cir.) (NEPACCO11), cert. denied,488 U.S. 821 (1988).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/4
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be given its plain meaning. 42 However, the court found the term "damages" to
be ambiguous when viewed outside the insurance context, but not when viewed
within the insurance context.43 The court concluded that the plain meaning of
the insurance context, referred only to legal
"damages," when interpreted within 44
damages and not to equitable relief.
Interestingly, the rationale of the NEPACCO II court contained several
propositions which the Missouri Supreme Court rejected in Farmland. The
court reasoned that its narrow construction of "damages" was consistent with the
provision of the CGL policy which defined the insurer's obligation as a whole,
to wit: to pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay
as damages., 4' According to the court, an expansive reading of the term "as
damages" would render the term "all sums" meaningless, in that the term "as
damages" would be mere
surplusage, as any and all obligations to pay would be
46
covered by the policy.
The court also reasoned, citing Hanna and Armco, that its limited
construction was consistent with the distinction traditionally drawn in insurance
law between monetary damages and equitable relief 4 7 The court further
reasoned that a limited construction of "damages" was consistent with the
statutory scheme of CERCLA, which purportedly differentiates between
recovery of cleanup costs on the one hand and recovery of damages for injury,
destruction, or loss of natural resources on the other.4 In the case at bar, the
federal and state governments sought only recovery of equitable cleanup costs,
which, according to the court, precluded coverage.49

D. Recent Cases Holding that CGL PoliciesCover Environmental
Cleanup Costs
In contrast to the technical meaning accorded the term "damages" by courts
such as Armco and NEPACCO II, recent cases which have interpreted the term
to include response costs have uniformly given the term its lay meaning. In New

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

1d.
Id.
Id. at 985-86.
Id. at 986.
Id.
Id.

48. Id. Section 9607(a)(4)(A) of CERCLA holds a person liable for "all costs of
removal or remedial action," while Section 9607(a)(4)(C) provides that a person is liable
for "damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources." 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a)(4)(A), (C) (1994). The insurer in NEPACCO II concluded that this difference
in language reflects a congressional intent to distinguish between response costs and

damages. Continental Ins. Co. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d
977, 986 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).

49. NEPACCO 11, 842 F.2d at 987.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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Castle County v. HartfordAccident & Indemnity Co.,50 the Federal District Court
for the District of Delaware held that the term "damages" encompassed claims
for equitable relief under Delaware law."1 The court expressly rejected the
application of a legal and technical interpretation of the term as advanced in
Armco.s2 The court further noted that standard English dictionaries made no
distinction between actions at law and actions in equity. Hence, the ordinary
meaning of "damages" included equitable remedies.5 3
In Chesapeake Utilitiesv. American Home Assurance,54 the Federal District
Court of Delaware interpreted the term "damages" under both Delaware and
Maryland law. In its interpretation of Delaware law, the court declined the
invitation to overturn its holding in New Castle, touting that decision as a
55
"logical and accurate depiction of Delaware law."
Construing Maryland law, the court held that it could not be said as a matter
of law that cleanup costs were outside the scope of "damages" recoverable under
a CGL policy.5 6 The court criticized Armco as a misstatement of Maryland
law, 7 finding its narrow, technical definition of "damages" to be grounded upon
the "ancient division between law and equity" which did not comport with a lay
meaning of the term.5" While the court acknowledged the split of authority on
this issue, it also noted the growing body of case law that rejected Armco's
reasoning. 9
In Avondale Industries v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 6 the Second Circuit
became the first federal appellate court to hold that environmental cleanup costs
are "damages" under a CGL policy. 6' Applying New York law, the Second
Circuit held that an insurer was obligated to defend an insured inasmuch as the
insured was liable for cleanup costs.62 In so holding, the court expressly rejected
the holdings of Armco and NEPA CCO1H.63 The court noted that New York law
required the terms of the policy to be given their natural and reasonable
meaning.6 The court reasoned that in the absence of clear and unmistakable
language to exclude coverage, the ordinary meaning of the term "damages"

50. 673 F. Supp. 1359 (D. Del. 1987).
51. Id. at 1367.
52. Id. at 1365.
53. Id.
54. 704 F. Supp. 551 (D. Del. 1989).
55. Id. at 565.
56. Id. at 561.
57. Id. at 558.
58. Id. at 560.
59. Id.
60. 887 F.2d 1200 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 906 (1990).
61. See Davis, supranote 2, at 985.
62. Avondale Indus., 887 F.2d at 1207.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1206-07.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/4
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included cleanup costs. 65 The Avondale holding is limited to an insurer's duty
to defend,' but it "establishes persuasive precedent analytically compatible with
the indemnification context. 67
In Independent Petrochemical Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
(IPC),68 the District of Columbia Circuit expressly rejected NEPACCO II and
held that "damages" included environmental cleanup costs under Missouri law. 9
In analyzing NEPACCO II, the court noted that while it should give deference
to a home circuit's view of state law, it should not devote "blind adherence" to
such a view.70 The court concluded that NEPACCO Imisread Missouri law and
should not be followed. 71 The court reasoned that liability for environmental
cleanup costs naturally comports with an ordinary understanding of the term
"damages.' 72 As an aside, the IPC court mentioned that its research revealed
that, with the exception of NEPACCO II, courts had uniformly held cleanup
costs to constitute "damages" when the operative state's
73 rules of insurance
contract construction applied the ordinary meaning test.
E. The Current Split ofAuthority
CGL policies have been construed by state and federal courts to cover
environmental cleanup costs under the laws of the following states: Alaska, 74
California,75 Colorado,76 Delaware,7 7 Georgia,78 Idaho,79 Illinois,80 Iowa,8

65. Id. at 1207.
66. The court did not determine whether the insurer had a duty to indemnify for
cleanup costs because that issue was not raised on appeal. Id. at 1208.
67. Davis, supra note 2, at 985-86.
68. 944 F.2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1011 (1992).
69. Id. at 947.
70. Id. at 944-45.
71. Id. at 945.
72. Id. at 946.
73. Id.
74. Mapco Alaska Pipeline, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co., 795 F. Supp. 941, 952
(D. Alaska 1991).
75. AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 799 P.2d 1253, 1269 (Cal. 1990).
76. Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. v. Continental Casualty Co., 834 F. Supp.
1254, 1259 (D. Colo. 1993).
77. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co., No. 87C-5E11, 1992 WL 22690, at *12 (Del. Jan. 16, 1992).
78. Atlantic Wood Indus. v. Lumbermen's Underwriting Alliance, 396 S.E.2d 541,
543 (Ga. App. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991).
79. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Pintlar Corp., 948 F.2d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1991).
80. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1216 (Ill.
1992).
81. A.Y. McDonald Indus. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 475 N.W.2d 607, 624 (Iowa
1991).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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86
85
Kansas,8 2 Maryland,8 3 Massachusetts, 4 Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
88
Nebraska, New Hampshire,8 9 New Jersey, 90 New York,9' North Carolina,92
Ohio,9 3 Oklahoma, 94 Oregon, 95 Pennsylvania, 96 Texas, 97 Utah,98 Vermont, 99 and

Washington.'t° Not coincidentally, the courts in each of these cases accorded the
term "damages" its plain and ordinary meaning.
On the other hand, CGL policies have been interpreted not to cover
environmental cleanup costs under the laws of the following states: Arkansas,'

82. Cessna Aircraft Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 900 F. Supp. 1489,
1497 (D. Kan. 1995).
83. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1021, 1032 (Md. 1993).
84. Hazen Paper Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 555 N.E.2d 576, 583
(Mass. 1990).
85. United States Aviex v. Travelers Ins. Co., 336 N.W.2d 838, 843 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1983).
86. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 457 N.W.2d 175, 184
(Minn. 1990).
87. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 512 (Mo. 1997).
88. Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 118 F.3d 1263, 1270 (8th
Cir. 1997).
89. Coakley v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 618 A.2d 777, 787 (N.H. 1992).
90. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 846-47 (N.J.
1993).
91. Avondale Indus. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1207 (2d Cir. 1989)
(limiting the holding to the insurer's duty to defend).
92. Spangler Constr. Co. v. Industrial Crankshaft & Eng'g Co., 388 S.E.2d 557,
569 (N.C. 1990).
93. Sanborn Plastics Corp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 616 N.E.2d 988, 998
(Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (limiting the holding to the insurer's duty to defend).
94. National Indem. Co. v. United States Pollution Control, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 765,
767 (W.D. Okla. 1989).
95. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting Co., 870
P.2d 260, 267 (Ore. Ct. App. 1994).
96. Federal Ins. Co. v. Susquehanna Broad. Co., 727 F. Supp. 169, 174 (M.D. Pa.
1989) (limiting the recovery of damages to the value of the property damaged).
97. Snydergeneral Corp. v. Century Indem. Co., 113 F.3d 536,539 (5th Cir. 1997).
98. Quaker State Mini-Lube, Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 868 F. Supp. 1278,
1293-94 (D. Utah 1994).
99. Gerrish Corp. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 947 F.2d 1023, 1030 (2d. Cir.
1991).
100. Boeing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 784 P.2d 507, 516 (Wash. 1990).
101. Parker Solvents Co. v. Royal Ins. Cos. of Am., 950 F.2d 571, 571 (8th Cir.
1991) (following NEPA CCO I).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/4
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05
Connecticut," 2 Florida, 0 3 Maine," ° South Carolina," and Wisconsin.'

Notably, none of the courts in these cases accorded the term "damages" its plain

and ordinary meaning. Clearly, there is a substantial split of authority on this
issue, making the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Farmlandall the more

significant.
IV. INSTANT DECISION

In Farmland,the Missouri Supreme Court held that the term "damages,"
as contained in the various CGL and excess liability policies at issue,
encompassed equitable relief.'0 7 The court's endeavor to define the term turned
on its application of Missouri insurance law, which required "damages" to be
given its "ordinary meaning" - that which "the average layperson would
reasonably understand" - because it was not plainly apparent that a technical
meaning was intended.'0 8 After consulting a standard English dictionary, the
court declared the ordinary meaning of "damages" to be "the estimated
reparation in money for detriment or injury sustained," or alternatively,
''compensation or satisfaction imposed by law for a wrong or injury caused by
a violation of a legal right."' 09 Based on these definitions, the court concluded
that a layperson would reasonably understand "damages" to include both legal
and equitable relief."0

102. Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life Cas. Corp., No. CV 91-03964325,
1995 WL 462270, at *23 (Conn. July 25, 1995) (according the term "damages" a narrow,
technical meaning).
103. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Hanna, 224 F.2d 499, 503 (5th Cir. 1955).
104. Patrons Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marois, 573 A.2d 16, 19 (Me. 1990)
(according the term "damages" a narrow, technical meaning).
105. Braswell v. Faircloth, 387 S.E.2d 707, 710 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
costs incurred to prevent probable environmental damage precluded the existence of
property damage).
106. Regent Ins. Co. v. City of Manitowoc, 556 N.W.2d 405, 410 (Wis. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that CERCLA's distinction between "damages" and "cleanup costs"
excludes cleanup costs from the definition of "damages").
107. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 512 (Mo. 1997).
108. Id. at 508. Under Missouri law, the key to insurance policy interpretation is
to first determine whether the policy language is ambiguous or unambiguous. See Peters
v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co., 853 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Mo. 1993). Where ambiguity exists,
the policy is enforced against the insurer. Id. Where policy language is unambiguous,
it is enforced as written absent a statute or public policy considerations requiring
coverage. Id. Where such language is unambiguous, yet it is disputed whether a term be
accorded a technical definition or one that would be reasonably understood by the
average layperson, i.e., a plain meaning, the latter prevails. Id. at 303.
109. Farmland, 941 S.W.2d at 508 (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 571 (196 1)).
I10. Id. at 509.
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In so holding, the court overruled the contrary conclusion reached by the
Eastern District of the Missouri Court of Appeals in McDonough v. Liberty
MutualInsurance Co. The Farmlandcourt explained that while McDonough
correctly stated that Missouri law required the term "damages" to be given its
ordinary meaning, it incorrectly defined "damages" as encompassing only legal
remedies and not equitable relief."2
The court rejected a barrage of arguments posited by Insurers, many of
which were endorsed by the Eight Circuit in NEPA CCO I. First, the court
rejected the notion that the term "damages" must be defined within the insurance
context because it is ambiguous when viewed outside of that context.1 3 The
court believed that NEPACCO II "misconstrue[d] and circumvent[ed]" Missouri
law in defining "damages" in this manner, given the complete absence of
authority allowing Missouri courts to do so." 4 The court specified that, although
it defines a word within the context of the relevant sentence or writing,
doing so
5
is quite different from defining a word in the insurance context."
Second, the court rejected the argument that to define "damages" to
encompass both legal and equitable relief would render the term superfluous
when read in the context of its general insurance obligation," 6 in that any
obligation to pay would be covered by the policy." 7 The court stated that the
ordinary meaning of the term limits its purview to "compensation or reparation
for an injury," thus, excluding from coverage fines and penalties which are
imposed as punishment.'
Third, the court rejected the proposition that environmental response costs
are costs of doing business-not damages-because they are imposed to enforce
compliance with CERCLA and not to compensate a third party for sustained
injuries .9 The court noted that CERCLA permits responsible parties to insure
against "the cost of actions for which they are liable."' 20 The court also stressed
that it was not its place to disturb the public policy considerations incorporated
into CERCLA
by Congress; its job was limited to defining the term
,, 2
,,damages. l l

111. 921 S.W.2d 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
112. Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 509 (Mo. 1997).
113. Id. at 510.
114. Id.
115. Id. The court opined that even if it were to define the term "damages" in the
insurance context, it would likely find the term to include equitable relief. Id.
116. The court stated: "The company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums
which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of...
property damage ...." Id. at 507.
117. Id. at510-11.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 511.
120. Id. (paraphrasing 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1) (1994)).
121. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss3/4
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Fourth, the court rejected two parallel arguments that the term "damages"
should be defined in light of the circumstances which existed at the time when
the policies were purchased. The first argument posited that the policies would
have expressly provided for coverage of equitable relief had the parties so
intended. 2 The court retorted that this argument ignored the ordinary meaning
of the term "damages. '' 23 The second argument reasoned that none of the parties
could have intended the policies to cover CERCLA response costs when
purchased because CERCLA was enacted subsequent to those purchases. 24 The
court responded that because the term "damages" was given its ordinary
meaning, it encompasses types of relief not available at the time the policy was
drafted. 25 The court felt that it would "defy logic" to hold that a claim is not
merely because it did not exist at the time the
covered by an insurance
26 policy
purchased.
was
policy
Finally, the court rejected the argument that CERCLA's definition of
"damages" governed this case. 127 CERCLA's definition notwithstanding, the
court responded that Missouri law required terms of an insurance policy to be
defined in accordance with a standard English dictionary. 28 When the term
"damages" was defined in this manner, the court unanimously concluded that the
response costs
CGL and excess liability policies at issue covered environmental
29
incurred under CERCLA and analogous state statutes.
V. COMMENT

The Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation of "damages" in Farmlandis
clearly consistent with other courts which have given that term its plain and
ordinary meaning. 30 Even were there no such consistency, one can hardly
criticize the court's interpretation of "damages" in this manner as untenable or
illogical. The average person is most likely not aware of the common law
distinction between actions at law and actions in equity; hence, the same person
cannot be expected to inject such a distinction into the term "damages."
Despite the analytical soundness of the Farmlanddecision, holdings of this
nature (i.e., those that place ultimate responsibility for environmental cleanup
costs on insurers) pose a threat to the continuing availability of environmental
liability insurance. Moreover, the current lack of uniformity among courts has

Id.
Id.
CERCLA was enacted in 1980.
Farmland Indus., Inc. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 511 (Mo. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 511-12. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
128. Farmland,941 S.W.2d at 512.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

129. Id.
130. See supra notes 78-94.
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created other problems as well, namely, forum shopping and an inefficient use
of resources.
A. PotentialDemise ofthe EnvironmentalLiability InsuranceMarket
Farnland-typedecisions ("Farmlandregime") threaten the existence of the
environmental liability insurance market in that they diminish the certainty that
insurers have in the calculations upon which they base their policy prices, which
in turn diminishes their confidence in their ability to provide effective
environmental liability insurance while maintaining solvency.' 3 I As a result,
insurers will either substantially increase policy prices or will forego providing
environmental liability insurance altogether.
Insurance typically performs the following three functions: (1) risk transfer
from parties who are comparatively risk averse to those more willing to bear the
risk; (2) risk spreading by pooling individual risks; and (3) risk allocation by
charging premiums that reflect the level of risk posed by each insured."'
Insurance can perform these functions effectively and efficiently only under a
special condition of uncertainty as to the occurrence of future events. 33 To
illustrate, imagine a continuum, one end of which is represented by a complete
lack of certainty as to the risks posed by potential insureds, while the other end
is represented by an absolute certainty of the occurrence of future events. To
provide insurance under conditions of complete uncertainty would resemble a
raw gamble, because insurers would have no mechanism by which to
appropriately allocate risk. On the other hand, complete certainty as to future
events obviates the need for insurance, because prospective insureds would have
no need to pool and transfer risk. The requisite condition of uncertainty rests on
a proper balance between these two extremes. The Farmlandregime shifts this
balance toward uncertainty, thereby making the provision of environmental
liability insurance more of a gamble than insurers are willing to bear. The
ultimate consequence of this is to force insureds to bear full responsibility for
environmental liability, thereby seriously threatening their solvency. At first
blush, this result might not seem very disturbing to those who think that it is
appropriate for potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under CERCLA to bear
full responsibility for the harm they caused. However, such a position is
premised on the faulty presumption that those liable under CERCLA are always
those that caused the environmental harm. It is important to bear in mind that
CERCLA's strict liability regime imposes liability not only without regard to
fault, but without regard to causation as well. Therefore, given the scope of
parties liable under CERCLA, it is highly possible that a PRP did not in fact
cause a particular release of hazardous substances. Thus, it is disturbing that the

13 1. See Abraham, supra note 2, at 955-56.
132. See Abraham, supra note 2, at 946.
133. See Abraham, supra note 2, at 946.
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provision of beneficial products or services may be terminated or discouraged
34
merely because their providers were unable to pool and allocate their risks.'
The Farmlandregime, therefore, is a double-edged sword; it threatens both
the continued existence of the environmental liability insurance market and the
solvency of insureds. A regime consisting of contrary holdings ("Hanna
regime"), however, would yield only a slightly more favorable result. Though
the environmental liability insurance market would not suffer under the Hanna
regime, insureds would remain threatened with insolvency, and productive
enterprise would in tum be discouraged. Though only a single-edged sword, the
Hannaregime is a sword nonetheless.
Thus, it is clear that these heightened risks of insolvency are not created by
ultimate court decisions, but rather by the mechanism for reaching those
decisions: the all-or-nothing assignment of responsibility. The solution,
therefore, is a mechanism whereby CERCLA liability is equitably allocated
between insurers and insureds.
In FederalInsuranceCo. v. SusquehannaBroadcastingCo.,135 the Federal
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania abandoned the all-ornothing approach in favor of one less extreme and purportedly more effective.
Under this approach, CGL coverage is available only if property damage has
actually occurred; coverage is not available if preventive or mitigating measures
are taken before a hazardous substance release has occurred. 136 However, once
property damage has occurred, the insurer's liability is based on the degree of
damage. If the property damage is reparable, the insurer is responsible for
cleanup costs to the extent of the fair market value of the property; the insured
is responsible for any excess. 137 If the property damage is irreparable, the
38
insurer's responsibility is equivalent to the decrease in its fair market value.
Although this approach ostensibly distributes liability in a more equitable
fashion than does the all-or-nothing approach, it has one major flaw. Since
134. This is not to say that productive enterprise takes priority over the prevention
of environmental harm. However, in the author's opinion, it is undisputable that the
provision of certain products or services, though potentially harmful to the environment,
are beneficial, if not indispensable, to modem society. Responsibility for the
environmental risks posed by these activities can be assumed via the purchase of
appropriately-priced insurance policies. Any realization of actual or threatened
environmental harm will thereby be remedied through insurance proceeds, although ex
post remedies cannot always restore the environment to its pre-harm condition. Under
such a scenario, it is arguably preferable to enable parties to conduct productive activities,
while simultaneously assuming responsibility for their environmental risks by purchasing
insurance, rather than to discourage the productive enterprises altogether.
135. 727 F. Supp. 169 (M.D. Pa. 1989), amended on reconsiderationin part by 738
F. Supp. 896 (M.D. Pa. 1990), aff'd, 928 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 823
(1991).
136. Id. at 174.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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coverage is not available until property damage has occurred, it creates a
disincentive for parties to take proactive measures to prevent or mitigate damage
caused by a threatened release of hazardous substances. Such a disincentive is
both environmentally harmful and inefficient, because cleanup costs increase
with the property damage.
As another alternative to the all-or-nothing approach, one commentator
recommends revamping CERCLA to equitably apportion retroactive liability
between insurers and insureds. 39 To date, the majority (if not all) of the
litigation surrounding this issue has involved CGL policies purchased prior to
the enactment of CERCLA. Herein lies the problem: the parties are litigating the
coverage of a liability which neither was aware of at the time the pertinent
policies were purchased. Insurers argue they should not be responsible for
liabilities not in existence at the time the relevant policies were issued, e.g.,
CERCLA, because the purchase and premium prices were based on existing
liabilities. Insureds, on the other hand, argue that they purchased these policies
to protect against such unexpected liability, and that it is therefore irrelevant that
the liability did not exist when the policies were issued. Both arguments seem
plausible. However, it seems unfair to hold one party fully responsible while
excusing the other. Apportioning responsibility between the parties seems very
appropriate, as each side is held responsible (albeit partially) for a cost it may
well have been fully responsible for, while not letting either side entirely off the
hook. Furthermore, this approach appears to provide for environmental
reparation while ensuring party solvency more effectively than does the all-ornothing approach.
A common-sense alternative, and one that does not require judicial or
Congressional action, is for insurers and insureds to specify the precise liabilities
covered by their policies during purchase negotiations.'
This approach
obviates the need for litigation since the scope of the policy is clear.
Furthermore, it effectively holds insureds fully responsible for the environmental
damage caused by their operations. For those liabilities specifically covered by
the policy, responsibility will have been accepted via the payment of
premiums.' 41 For those potential environmental liabilities not expressly covered,
responsibility will be accepted by the insured if and when the liability arises.
Though the latter scenario may threaten insureds with insolvency, fairness
requires them to accept such a risk if they engage in potentially environmentally
harmful activities.

139. See Davis, supra note 2, at 996-98. CERCLA imposes liability for hazardous
waste releases occurring prior to its enactment. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d
1506 (1Ith Cir. 1997).
140. This approach can only have prospective application, i.e., it would not solve

the dispute encountered in Farmland.
141. Assuming the premium price is commensurate with the environmental risk
posed.
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B. Forum Shopping andPreemptive Filing

Because many businesses and insurance companies conduct activities in
several states, several judicial fora are available to them. The combination of a
lack of uniformity among courts and multi-forum availability results in forum
shopping and preemptive filing-a race to the most favorable courthouse among
potential litigants. 142 These disputes, therefore, are not decided on the merits,
but rather on the relative expediency with which one of the parties is able to file
the initial pleading. Considering that our system of jurisprudence disapproves
of forum shopping (prevention of forum shopping is one of the rationales
underlying the Erie doctrine), this result seems highly inequitable.
Uniformity would obviously resolve this problem. However, unless
Congress were to revamp CERCLA in the manner previously described, the
likelihood of achieving uniformity is small, given the differences in state
insurance law.
C. Inefficient Use ofResources
The litigation that results from the lack of uniformity consumes large
amounts of time and money. The amount of money spent in this effort reduces
the amount available to remedy environmental damage. The amount of time
required by litigation often delays cleanup efforts, which increases the likelihood
of additional environmental harm, which in turn increases the possibility of
additional environmental liability. Though it is ultimately cheaper for the
successful litigant to resolve this matter in court, the current process is
inefficient when viewed as a whole. The resources spent on litigation would
better benefit societal interests if applied to environmental reparation. 143 Absent
modification of CERCLA, this situation is likely to persist, as the chances of
abolishing the current lack of uniformity by any other means are small.
VI. CONCLUSION
In FarmlandIndustries, Inc. v. Republic Insurance Co., the Missouri
Supreme Court held that environmental response costs incurred under CERCLA
and similar state statutes are covered by comprehensive general liability (CGL)
and various other excess liability insurance policies. More specifically, the court
defined the term "damages" contained in these policies to encompass both legal
and equitable remedies (e.g., environmental response costs, when given its plain
and ordinary meaning). Though-there is a substantial split of authority on this
issue among both state and federal courts, Farmlandis clearly consistent with
other courts which have given the term "damages" its ordinary meaning.

142. See Davis, supra note 2, at 994-95.
143. See Davis, supra note 27, at 932-33.
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However, this holding is not unproblematic. The present lack of uniformity
among courts concerning these issues results in forum shopping and an
inefficient use of resources. Moreover, the current all-or-nothing approach of
determining CGL policy coverage threatens the continued existence of the
environmental liability insurance market, and ultimately, insured solvency.
RYAN S. FEHLIG
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